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ASSESSING ONE PSYCHOLOGICAL DIMENSION OF EAST-WEST COMPETITION --ETC(U)
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
STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE
US ARMY WAR COLLEGE
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**ASSESSING ONE PSYCHOLOGICAL DIMENSION
OF EAST-WEST COMPETITION IN EUROPE**

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OF EAST-WEST COMPETITION IN EUROPE

by

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Robert B. Mahoney, Jr.

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military issues research memo.

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FOREWORD

This memorandum was presented at the Military Policy Evaluation: Quantitative Applications workshop conference hosted by the Strategic Studies Institute in mid-1977. During the workshop, sponsored by DePaul University and the Strategic Studies Institute, academic and government experts presented the latest findings of formal models and statistical-mathematical approaches to the processes of military decisionmaking, assistance, intervention, and conflict resolution.

The Military Issues Research Memoranda program of the Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, provides a forum for the timely dissemination of analytical papers such as those presented at the workshop.

This memorandum is being published as a contribution to the field of national security research and study. The data and opinions presented are those of the author and in no way imply the indorsement of the College, the Department of the Army or the Department of Defense.



ROBERT G. YERKS
Major General, USA
Commandant

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

DR. ROBERT B. MAHONEY, JR., is manager of the Projections and Plans Department of CACI, Inc., in Arlington, Virginia. From June 1974 to September 1977 he was a member of the professional staff of the Center for Naval Analyses. Dr. Mahoney earned his bachelor of arts degree from the University of Missouri-St. Louis in 1971, and his doctorate in political science from Northwestern University in 1974. He is presently engaged in an analysis of the postwar crisis management activity of the Soviet Union.

ASSESSING ONE PSYCHOLOGICAL DIMENSION OF EAST-WEST COMPETITION IN EUROPE

This paper examines the perceptions of allied leaders in the United Kingdom, France, and the Federal Republic of Germany, focusing upon the amount of interbloc tension in Europe these leaders perceived over the period 1946-70.¹

The paper begins by outlining some of the reasons why these perceptions are of potential importance for the development of comprehensive assessments of East-West political-military relations.

The next section presents the techniques that have been employed to systematically monitor these perceptions and shows the course they have taken since World War II. On the basis of an assessment of these trends, some implications are drawn which bear on American (Western) political-military policy.

The third section deals with selected aspects of the larger framework of East-West competition within which leaders' perceptions were formed over the period. The analysis centers on such factors as Soviet and American actions, the strategic balance between the superpowers, and the defense burdens (defense expenditures/GDP) of the three Western European nations. This analysis shows the extent to which the leaders' perceptions can be empirically related to other elements in this

larger framework of competition. The section also highlights some of the more significant relationships between nonperceptual elements in this ensemble, such as the relationship between Soviet and American behaviors and the defense expenditures of the Western European states.

The final section provides summary conclusions concerning the extent to which factors such as elite perceptions can be systematically monitored, their position within the larger structure of East-West relations, and the implications which the paper's findings have for defense analysis.

PERCEPTIONS AND THE CONTEXT OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS

The Contextual Analysis of East-West Relations. The analyses to be presented are predicated upon the hypothesis that East-West relations take the form of a long-term multidimensional competition between the blocs. I assume that this competition includes shared norms or values which limit the scope of interbloc conflict.² Because of these limits, this competition takes place during "peacetime" (defined by the absence of major interbloc war) and involves multiple dimensions of interaction rather than simply the military factors that would be decisive during warfare. While the military dimensions of this competition are significant in and of themselves, we can, under this set of assumptions, obtain a comprehensive understanding of their role in this competition only by locating them within the framework of this larger multidimensional system.

As a consequence, to fully understand East-West competition as it has evolved (and is likely to evolve in the future), we need to monitor the various nonmilitary dimensions on which this competition takes place (e.g., public and elite perceptions concerning East-West relations, and the course of economic growth within each of the blocs—which provides part of the resource base required for conducting the competition in other sectors). After we have done this, we then need to relate the various nonmilitary dimensions to one another and to the military factors in order to understand how the entire system operates.³

Perceptions and East-West Competition. Public and elite perceptions are among the set of nonmilitary factors that have played a major role in defense thinking within both the United States and USSR.⁴ While there may be questions concerning our practical ability, within the prevailing state of the art in social science, to systematically assess

perceptions (one of the points addressed in this paper), it is clear that they play a major role in considerations of deterrence and other military questions. Perceptions occupy a central position in most characterizations of the larger system of interbloc competition.

The perceivers analyzed in this paper are government leaders in Western European nations. The perceptions have to do with their evaluation of the likelihood of interbloc conflict in Europe.⁵

Such perceptions can be linked to other elements in the ensemble of East-West relations in two ways. Most immediately, they can prompt or influence national decisions. At the same time, they can be affected by other elements within this context (e.g., the potential influence of shifts in superpower behavior upon the attitude of European leaders). The analysis to be presented will deal with both aspects of the question.

In dealing with leaders' evaluations of the state of East-West tension in Europe, we are considering only one of several psychological dimensions. Other types of attitudes and perceptions are also likely to play a role. As a result, we would not expect to find extremely strong relationships between these particular perceptions and other factors, though there should be patterns of at least moderate strength. By the same token, psychological factors make up only part of the system of East-West relations. The analyses to be presented trace out only sections of this larger whole, searching for interdependencies between factors which are reflected in the form of covariation. To the extent that patterns of moderate to strong strength are uncovered, the results will provide reinforcement for the initial hypothesis that an interdependent system of East-West competition exists and can be identified within the prevailing state of the art.

MONITORING LEADER'S PERCEPTIONS

Methods. The perceptual data to be employed was originally collected by Kjell Goldmann of the Swedish Institute of International Affairs.⁶ The perceptual indicators were constructed by means of a content analysis of *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*.

The first step in this process involved the identification of all statements by government leaders in NATO and WTO nations which dealt with the present or future state of relations between the European members of both blocs. Statements dealing with alliance to alliance relations were also included. The preponderance of the statements identified were made by leaders in the United States, Soviet Union,

United Kingdom, France, and Federal Republic of Germany, the last three being the states which are the focus of the present analysis.

After these statements were identified, all sentences in paragraphs which contained relevant themes were coded into one of four categories of content: favorable units (positive predictions, hopes, intentions, or other assertions dealing with interbloc relations in Europe), unfavorable units, neutral units (comments bearing on East-West relations that did not have a definite valance), and nonrelevant units (statements in the paragraphs selected that did not bear on East-West relations).

After the statements had been classified into categories, yearly national tension perception scores were produced by employing the Janis-Fadner coefficient of imbalance.⁷ This produced scores on the range of +1.00 to -1.00:

+1.00 Highly favorable perceptions of the state of interbloc relations in Europe (little tension perceived);

0.00 Neutral point;

-1.00 Negative perceptions (much tension perceived).

If fewer than 15 assertions per nation per year were identified, no score was assigned to that state in that year and the observation was treated as missing data (a practice followed in this paper).

Results. The scores for the United Kingdom, France, and the Federal Republic of Germany are plotted in figure 1. Summary statistics are presented in table 1.

TABLE 1
MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS FOR EUROPEAN PERCEPTIONS⁸

| <u>State</u> | <u>Variable Code</u> | <u>Mean</u> | <u>Standard Deviation</u> | <u>(N)</u> |
|----------------|----------------------|-------------|---------------------------|------------|
| United Kingdom | UKp | 0.00 | .11 | (25) |
| France | FRp | 0.02 | .21 | (25) |
| West Germany | WGp | -0.03 | .14 | (19)* |

*Perceptions are assessed on an annual basis over the 25 year period 1946-75. The West German series has missing values for the years 1946-49, 1952, and 1960.

Evaluating the Results. After collecting the data, Goldmann evaluated the validity of using Kessing's as a source for the perceptions by coding selected periods for the United States and USSR, using *Department of State Bulletin* and the Soviet journal *International Affairs* as alternative sources. There was high agreement with the scores based on Kessing's.⁹

Moreover, the patterns taken by the perceptual variables are reasonable ones in light of the history of East-West relations in Europe over the period (since the coding rules exclude statements dealing with non-European matters, we would not expect extraregional events (e.g., the Cuban Missile Crisis) to be reflected, other than as part of a more general global process of change in interbloc relations).

The most unfavorable British and French perceptions occurred in 1948 and 1961—the years of the Berlin crises. These patterns lend credibility to the data.

The German case is somewhat different. There is missing data in 1948, thus no comparison can be made. In 1961 the German score is negative, but not as low as might be expected. This may be due to another factor which is reflected in the data set, the fact that the German leaders made very few statements concerning East-West relations in the period 1960-62. This may have been one of the ways in which the German leaders responded to (and attempted to manage) the Berlin crisis.¹⁰

Another reasonable pattern in the data is the way in which each national series enters a phase of 'psychological detente' during the 1960's in which evaluations of interbloc relations in Europe became consistently positive. The transition years were 1963 for the United Kingdom, 1964 for France, and 1966 for West Germany. This 'psychological detente' may have helped to ameliorate the impact of the 1968 Czech Crisis. While the 1968 scores are lower than the 1967 values in all three nations, none falls to the low levels found in the years of the earlier Berlin crises.

The figures in table 1 show that the average evaluation for each nation over the 25 year period was close to the indifference point (0.00) on the scale. Students of national character will note the low variability of the values of the phlegmatic British and the relatively more volatile scores of the French leaders.

Implications for Defense Analysis. Two implications bearing on defense policy can be drawn from an analysis of the trends presented in figure 1. The first is based on the observation that the 'psychological detente' has been fairly stable, particularly if one uses longevity as an index of stability and assumes that this 'detente' process dampened the impact of the 1968 Czech Crisis. It is noteworthy that this state of psychological detente antedates the rather dramatic series of Soviet-American accords initiated by the Nixon Administration that has come to stand in the eyes of many commentators as the embodiment of




FIG. 1: LEADERS' PERCEPTIONS

East-West detente.¹¹ These results suggest that this mental set, the existence of a psychological detente in the evaluations of key allied leaders, is likely to be a continuing factor of concern to American planners and decision makers.¹²

Secondly (and much more speculatively), these patterns of perception are consistent with (though hardly decisive evidence in favor of) one approach to allied relations. Consider the position of a US decision maker in 1970 (or today, if the trends hold). One way in which s/he could attempt to mobilize allied support for defense spending, joint operations and planning, and the other activities that serve to maintain the viability of the Atlantic Alliance would be to stress the threats and dangers the alliance faces, particularly over the shorter (psychologically more compelling) term.

However, given the existence of the psychological detente, such appeals might appear to be discrepant to the target audiences and simply be filtered out, as inconsistent signals, without having significant impact. A better strategy, one which is more consistent with the speculative inferences being made here, would be to take the same amount of energy and effort and focus it on the quieter sides of allied relations. Without minimizing the threat, one could focus on the processes of institution building, consultation, and coordination, without aiming at dramatic announcements or large amounts of short-term impact. This second type of approach would be more consistent with the mental sets displayed in figure 1 and would involve the evolution of a long-term approach to a long-term problem.

PERCEPTIONS AND THE SYSTEM OF EAST-WEST COMPETITION

Focus. Having seen the patterns taken by leaders' perceptions of tension, we now turn to relate these perceptions to other elements in the larger system of interbloc competition.

Because relatively little research has been devoted to the analysis of this larger system and due to some of the special methodological problems which occur when regression and correlation techniques are used to model complex interdependent systems (such as the system of interbloc competition hypothesized here), the modelling analyses to be presented must be regarded as only rough approximations of the extremely complex relationships being investigated.¹³ Attention will be focused on only those portions of this larger system which involve leaders' perceptions. Our interest is in the 'connections' which these

elements have with one another, including the relationships which exist between the nonperceptual elements.

Other Elements in the System. Two general types of factors will be related to the leaders' perceptions. The first set consists of hierarchical influences, factors which may have influenced these leaders without *directly* involving their nations. These factors are of relevance because the hierarchical character of global politics makes it reasonable to assume that the European leaders might have partially oriented their perceptions and actions on the words and behaviors of the two polar powers in the bipolar system (the United States and USSR). Factors in this category include superpower perceptions, the strategic balance between the United States and the Soviet Union, and the interactions of the two superpowers.

Articulated superpower perceptions will be indexed by using the Goldmann data base to assess their evaluation of the state of interbloc tension in Europe.

The Soviet-American strategic balance will be measured by a four value ordinal variable based on an interpretation of Goldmann's analysis of the postwar strategic competition:¹⁴

| | | | |
|-------------|-------------|-----|---------------------|
| phase one | 1946 - 1947 | (3) | (objective tension) |
| phase two | 1948 - 1956 | (2) | |
| phase three | 1957 - 1965 | (4) | |
| phase four | 1966 - 1970 | (1) | |

In this scheme a low number indexes low 'objective' tensions. In this sense the most 'balanced' period has been the phase of mutual second strike capabilities (parity) since the mid-1960's. The next most stable phase was 1948-56, when only the United States possessed the capacity to attack the other superpower's homeland with a major strategic strike. This is followed by the period in which neither superpower possessed significant nuclear forces. Finally, the period with the most 'objective' tension was 1957-65 when both superpowers had counterhome~~ic~~ nuclear capabilities but where the United States had a significant lead over the USSR. Parity (achieved sometime during the mid-1960's) ended this imbalance.

Superpower interactions (e.g., Soviet conflict towards the United States) will be measured by using the Azar-Sloan event data file.¹⁵ This data set was constructed by creating two scales which rank order the conflictual and cooperative/amicable behaviors nations direct towards

each other. (Illustrative marker items for these scales are presented in table 2). Quite reasonably, both scales give more weight to physical actions than to words.

TABLE 2
AZAR-SLOAN CONFLICT AND COOPERATION SCALES

| <u>CONFLICT</u> | |
|-----------------------|---|
| <u>Scale Value</u> | <u>Typical Behaviors</u> |
| 15 (most conflict) | large scale armed conflict |
| 14 | minor armed conflict |
| 13 | subversion, border clashes (small scale), skirmishes |
| 12 | breaks in diplomatic relations, nationalizations |
| 11 | attempts to cause economic difficulties for target nation; attempts to hinder movement of other nation's vessels in waterways |
| 10 | verbal threats, warnings, demands, accusations |
| 9 | milder forms of negative verbal behavior |
| 8 (least conflict) | neutral or indifferent behaviors |
| <u>COOPERATION</u> | |
| 1 (most cooperation) | merger of nations into one state |
| 2 | establishment of alliance |
| 3 | military aid |
| 4 | economic aid |
| 5 | meetings between heads of states; cultural agreements |
| 6 | verbal support for other nation's policies |
| 7 | more extensive verbal support and agreement (e.g., joint communiques) |
| 8 (least cooperation) | neutral or indifferent behaviors |

After the scales had been created, the behaviors exchanged by nations (as reported in a wide variety of public sources) were identified, assigned values and averaged to produce yearly means (e.g., mean conflict, United States towards USSR, 1956). Given the nature of international behavior (with a preponderance of words over deeds), the mean values occur in the verbal ends of the scales. These values provide a crude, but quite useful, summary index of the behaviors nations direct to one another.¹⁶

One point that needs to be noted is that these variables reflect all of the reported actions of the nations surveyed, not simply those behaviors that pertained to East-West tension in Europe. This is quite unlike the perceptual variables, which only deal with European affairs. Given the salience of European security affairs for the superpowers, this should not be a totally debilitating difference.

In the analyses these variables will be denoted by five character codes: actor (US or SU)/target/type (conflictual = 'c'; cooperative or amicable = 'a'). Hence USSUa refers to the amicable or cooperative behaviors directed by the United States towards the Soviet Union.

In addition to variables indexing hierarchical influences, we will also be concerned with a second set of factors which directly involve the three Western European states. Variables in this category include the behaviors of the Western European states towards the Soviet Union (and Soviet actions towards these states) and the defense burdens of the three nations. The behavioral variables will be taken from Azar-Sloan.¹⁷ The defense burdens (defense expenditures/gross domestic product) are taken from SIPRI.¹⁸ While aggregate indices of the latter type miss a great deal (such as efficiencies that might result in more defense being purchased at a lower cost and the distribution of spending between European and other theaters (e.g., the *force de frappe* versus the French Indian Ocean squadron), these numbers do provide one measure of the relative standing of defense matters in national policy agendas.

Possible Influences Upon European Perceptions. This section (the first of three sets of analyses dealing with perceptions in the context of the larger system of interbloc competition) has to do with the factors which might have influenced the course of leaders' evaluations of the state of interbloc tension in Europe. Bivariate relationships are presented in table 4.

TABLE 3. SUMMARY OF INDICATORS

Western European Perceptions

UKp
FRp
WGp

Hierarchical Influences

Superpower Perceptions

USp
SUP

Superpower-Superpower Interactions

| | |
|--------|--------|
| US-SUc | US-SUa |
| SU-USc | SU-USa |

Superpower Strategic Balance

BLNCE

Nonhierarchical Influences

Soviet Behaviors Towards Western European States

| | |
|--------|--------|
| SU-UKc | SU-UKa |
| SU-FRc | SU-FRa |
| SU-WGc | SU-WGa |

Western European Conflict Behaviors Towards the USSR¹⁹

UK-SUc
FR-SUc
WG-SUc

Western European Defense Burdens

UKdb
FRdb
WGdb

Key: US = United States; SU = Soviet Union; UK = United Kingdom;
FR = France; WG = West Germany; p = leaders' perceptions; c =
conflict behaviors; a = amicable/cooperative behaviors; db = defense
burdens (defense spending/GDP).

TABLE 4
CORRELATES OF ELITE PERCEPTIONS²⁰

| <u>Predictors</u> (Hierarchical) | UKp | FRp | WGp |
|-------------------------------------|------|------|------|
| BLNCE | -.20 | -.49 | -.39 |
| USp | .81 | .74 | .54 |
| SUp | .76 | .77 | .24 |
| US-SUc | -.51 | -.53 | -.82 |
| US-SUa | -.18 | .01 | -.13 |
| SU-USc | -.17 | -.29 | .11 |
| SU-USa | -.14 | -.14 | -.17 |
| (Nonhierarchical) | | | |
| SU-UKc | -.23 | | |
| SU-UKa | .19 | | |
| SU-FRc | | -.35 | |
| SU-FRa | | -.13 | |
| SU-WGc | | | -.30 |
| SU-WGa | | | -.35 |

There are a number of striking bivariate relationships in the table, all in the correct direction.²¹ (Correlations $\geq .30$, which account for 9 percent or more of the variance, are considered to be of substantive significance in these analyses).

In terms of the $r \geq .30$ criterion, only two variables are significant predictors across all three nations. Both are hierarchical factors pertaining to the two superpowers: American perceptions and American conflict behaviors towards the Soviet Union. Three variables are salient in two of the nations: the state of the strategic balance, Soviet perceptions, and Soviet conflict behaviors towards France and the FRG.

The basic impression these correlations give is one of interdependency or linkage. The perceptions appear to have a number of 'connections' with other elements in the hypothesized system of interbloc competition. This impression is confirmed when we examine the multivariate regression results which show the degree to which the patterns taken by the leaders' perceptions can be reproduced on the basis of those predictors in table 4 which passed the $r \geq .30$ criterion. The regression statistics are presented in table 5; plots showing the fit between the actual perception values and those estimated on the basis of the regression equations are given in figures 2, 3, and 4.

TABLE 5
REGRESSION RESULTS: EUROPEAN PERCEPTIONS²²

| <u>Dependent Variable</u> | <u>R</u> | <u>R²</u> | <u>F</u> | <u>Standard Deviation of Residuals</u> |
|---------------------------|----------|----------------------|----------|--|
| UKp | .88 | .79 | 24.0 | .05 |
| FRp | .89 | .80 | 14.3 | .10 |
| WGp | .90 | .81 | 11.2 | .07 |




FIG. 2: BRITISH PERCEPTIONS




FIG. 3: FRENCH PERCEPTIONS




FIG. 4: GERMAN PERCEPTIONS

The results of the regression analyses are quite favorable. The R values are high and there is a good congruence between the estimated values and the courses taken by the actual perception values in the three nations. These are the patterns we would expect to find if these perceptions were fairly well-connected elements within a larger system of East-West relations, as initially conjectured.

Moreover, the results add additional emphasis to the earlier observations, based on the correlations, concerning the importance of hierarchical factors involving the United States and USSR as predictors of the European leaders' perceptions. All of the predictors in the British equation are hierarchical variables. Taken by themselves, the hierarchical predictors in the French equation can account for all of the variance explained by that equation.²³ The two nonhierarchical variables in the German equation add only 6 percent to the variance explained by that model's hierarchical factors. The actions and words (articulated perceptions) of the United States and Soviet Union appear to be important factors for an understanding of European leaders' perceptions of interbloc relations.

Perceptions and Other Possible Influences Upon European States' Conflict Behaviors Directed to the USSR. Continuing with our exploration of the larger system of East-West competition in which perceptions play a part, this section investigates possible influences upon the conflict behaviors (primarily verbal behaviors) that the three European nations directed to the Soviet Union over the period 1948-70. The bivariate correlations are presented in table 6.

Examining these results, it can be seen that the European leaders' perceptions have an appreciable correlation with the conflict behaviors expressed by their nations towards the USSR in two of the three cases (West Germany is the exception and even there the coefficient is close to the .30 criterion). Since these perceptions are only one of a number of psychological influences that might affect the conflict behaviors, the magnitudes of the correlations are not surprising.

Turning to the other predictors, we can see that the conflict behaviors have a number of additional 'connections' with other elements in the hypothesized interbloc system. Two variables are significant predictors across all three nations; both are hierarchical factors similar to the predictors which played such a prominent role in the preceding section (articulated Soviet perceptions and US conflict behaviors (predominantly verbal) toward the USSR). Articulated American perceptions are salient in two of the nations.

TABLE 6. THE CORRELATES OF EUROPEAN CONFLICT BEHAVIORS DIRECTED TO THE SOVIET UNION²⁴

| <u>Predictors</u> | <u>UK-SUc</u> | <u>FR-SUc</u> | <u>WG-SUc</u> |
|-------------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| (Hierarchical) | | | |
| BLNCE | .05 | .15 | .12 |
| USp | -.30 | -.41 | -.17 |
| SUp | -.47 | -.42 | -.42 |
| US-SUc | .48 | .50 | .41 |
| US-SUa | -.01 | -.10 | .18 |
| SU-USc | .23 | .15 | -.14 |
| SU-USa | .24 | .10 | .30 |
| (Nonhierarchical) | | | |
| <u>UKp</u> | -.35 | | |
| <u>FRp</u> | | -.33 | |
| <u>WGp</u> | | | -.27 |
| SU-UKc | .11 | | |
| SU-UKa | -.51 | | |
| SU-FRc | | .68 | |
| SU-FRa | | .28 | |
| SU-WGc | | | .18 |
| SU-WGa | | | -.06 |

Another perspective on these 'connections' is provided in table 7 and figures 5, 6, and 7 which present the multiple regression results showing the extent to which the patterns taken by the conflict variables can be accounted for on the basis of the other elements.²⁵

With the exception of the French equation, the 'connections' presented in the multiple regression results are not as strong as those found in the previous section, though the results are respectable in themselves and do lend support to the proposition that an interconnected system exists. It is difficult to account for the superiority of the French results with only three cases in the comparison. It is possible that this is due to France's status through much of this period as a 'nonconforming' alliance member, which might have made it more responsive to other elements in the larger political-military system.²⁶ However, it is not possible to come to any strong conclusions on this point.

Comparing the relative impact of hierarchical and nonhierarchical factors, as reflected in regression analyses contrasting these two sets,

**TABLE 7. REGRESSION RESULTS: EUROPEAN CONFLICT
BEHAVIORS TOWARDS THE SOVIET UNION**

| <u>Dependent Variable</u> | <u>R</u> | <u>R²</u> | <u>F</u> | <u>Standard Deviation of Residuals</u> |
|-------------------------------|----------|----------------------|----------|--|
| UK-SUc | .69 | .48 | 3.17 | .28 |
| FR-SUc | .80 | .65 | 6.38 | .27 |
| WG-SUc | .54 | .29 | 2.69 | .27 |




FIG. 5: BRITISH CONFLICT TO USSR




FIG. 6: FRENCH CONFLICT TO USSR




FIG. 7: GERMAN CONFLICT TO USSR

the results are more mixed than was the case when the leaders' perceptions were the dependent variable.²⁷ In the German case all of the predictors which passed the .30 criterion are hierarchical factors. Taken individually, the nonhierarchical factors account for more variance in the French case and the two sets are tied in the case of the UK. However, in each of the countries the hierarchical factors pertaining to the actions and words of the United States and USSR account for respectable amounts of variance and, as a consequence, lend support to the earlier finding that these superpower influences appear to play a central role in the hypothesized system of East-West competition.

Perceptions and Other Possible Influences Upon the Defense Burdens of Western European Nations. The final set of analyses have to do with the influence of leaders' perceptions and the other factors analyzed previously upon the defense burdens (defense expenditures/GDP) of the United Kingdom, France, and the Federal Republic of Germany.²⁸

TABLE 8
THE CORRELATES OF EUROPEAN DEFENSE BURDENS

| <u>Predictors</u> (Hierarchical) | <u>UKdb</u> | <u>FRdb</u> | <u>WGdb</u> |
|-------------------------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| BLNCE | .10 | .29 | .41 |
| USp | -.30 | -.47 | .27 |
| SUp | -.13 | -.26 | -.09 |
| US-SUc | .65 | .80 | .18 |
| US-SUa | .00 | -.01 | -.42 |
| SU-USc | .00 | .00 | .39 |
| SU-USa | .58 | .74 | -.05 |
| (Nonhierarchical) | | | |
| UKp | -.20 | | |
| FRp | | -.43 | |
| WGp | | | -.31 |
| SU-UKc | -.13 | | |
| SU-UKa | .20 | | |
| SU-FRc | | .20 | |
| SU-FRa | | .25 | |
| SU-WGc | | | .17 |
| SU-WGa | | | .44 |

The correlations support the hypothesis that the relative allocation of resources to the defense sector varies in accordance with such factors as perceived levels of tension, behaviors exchanged between nations, and changes in the strategic balance. These 'connections' vary across nations to a greater extent than was the case in earlier analyses: no predictor is salient in all three states. Four variables account for substantial variance in two states: articulated American perceptions, US conflict towards the USSR, amicable Soviet behaviors towards the United States, and (significantly for present purposes) European leaders' perceptions.

Table 9 and figures 8, 9, and 10 show the multivariate relationships between the set of predictors underlined in table 8 and the European defense burdens.

TABLE 9
REGRESSION RESULTS: EUROPEAN DEFENSE BURDENS²⁹

| <u>Dependent Variable</u> | <u>R</u> | <u>R²</u> | <u>F</u> | <u>Standard Deviation of Residuals</u> |
|---------------------------|----------|----------------------|----------|--|
| UKdb | .71 | .50 | 4.80 | 1.03 |
| FRdb | .89 | .79 | 12.50 | .66 |
| WGdb | .64 | .41 | 1.56 | .48 |

There is a good fit between the actual and estimated French values. The British equation captures the overall trend while overestimating the oscillations in the series. This is probably due, in part, to the fact that the set of predictors does not include indicators of the smoothing effects of bureaucratic inertia and incremental decision making. The fit between the actual and estimated German values is fair.

As was the case in previous analyses, hierarchical variables are salient predictors. All of the variables in the British equation fall into this category. Hierarchical variables are clearly superior predictors in the case of France and slightly superior in the case of West Germany.³⁰

CONCLUSIONS

The goals of this paper have been to present techniques that can be employed to systematically monitor the articulated perceptions of




FIG. 8: BRITISH DEFENSE BURDEN




FIG. 9: FRENCH DEFENSE BURDEN




FIG. 10: GERMAN DEFENSE BURDEN

government leaders; to use these methods to chart the course of leaders' perceptions in the United Kingdom, France, and the Federal Republic of Germany concerning the state of interbloc tension in Europe; and to locate these perceptions within the context of a larger system of East-West competition that was hypothesized to have existed since World War II.

The methodology employed by Goldmann has been presented and validated. When indexed by these methods, perceptions in the three Western European nations assumed reasonable profiles over time, reflecting prominent events such as the Berlin crises and the onset of East-West detente. One conclusion based on this section of the analysis is that it is within the present state of the art in social science to monitor factors such as elite perceptions in a systematic and objective manner. More speculatively, on the basis of the patterns taken by the perceptions since the early 1960's, it was conjectured that a less demonstrative long-haul approach to alliance relations might be the most effective course for US policy.

Examining selected aspects of the larger system in which leaders'

perceptions were hypothesized to operate and using Ordinary Least Squares regression to identify patterns of covariation, a pattern of fairly strong 'connections' was discovered. These 'connections' support the hypothesis that a complex interdependent structure of East-West relations has existed since the Second World War in which perceptions have played a part.

When examined as a dependent variable in the regression analyses, the courses taken by leaders' perceptions in the three European nations could be accurately reproduced on the basis of their relationships with other elements in the hypothesized system of interbloc competition.

As independent variables the specific perceptions analyzed were salient bivariate predictors for two of the three nations in both comparisons; as predictors of European states' conflict behaviors towards the Soviet Union for the United Kingdom and France and as predictors of defense burdens for France and West Germany. Moreover, other elements in the hypothesized system accounted for fair to high amounts of variance.

Given the salience of perceptions as a predictor of both dependent variables in the case of France and (more importantly) the better fit of French multiple regression equations, it is tempting to attribute these findings to France's status as a 'nonconforming' alliance member for much of this period, which may have made it more responsive to external influences. With only three nations in the comparison, however, it is not possible to come to definite conclusions on this point.

In all of the regression analyses, hierarchical factors—variables pertaining to the actions and articulations of the two superpowers—play a prominent role in predicting the perceptions and behaviors of the three Western European nations. These results confirm the pivotal role of the two 'polar' actors in the structure of East-West relations.

More generally, the results presented in this paper suggest that it is possible to deal with apparently 'soft' factors such as perceptions and their relationships with other factors in the broader ensemble of East-West relations in a systematic and objective fashion. By doing this we can come to a better understanding of the system of East-West competition that structures peacetime political-military policy and operations. Such analyses will also increase our comprehension of the roles played by military forces and defense policies in long-term competitive relationships of the type that the West is presently engaged in and is likely to face for the foreseeable future.

ENDNOTES

1. This paper is based on two earlier presentations. The principal source is "European Perceptions and East-West Competition," a paper presented at the March 1977 meeting of the International Studies Association. Additional material is taken from "An Assessment of Public and Elite Perceptions in France, The United Kingdom, and the Federal Republic of Germany," CNA Professional Paper No. 164, February 1977.

In this paper I have retained most of the empirical analyses of the earlier presentations while abbreviating or eliminating most of the sections having to do with methodology and indicators. A much more extensive discussion of these points is contained in the ISA paper cited above.

I am grateful to Kjell Goldmann of the Swedish Institute of International Affairs for providing the data used to index leaders' perceptions. I am also grateful to Richard Van Atta and Richard Cottam, the chairperson and discussant of the ISA panel at which most of this material was originally presented, for their comments.

2. For further discussion of such normative structures, consult Goldmann (1971) and McConnell and Kelly (1973).

3. Two of the sets of indicators examined in this paper bear more or less directly on military affairs. The defense burdens (defense expenditures/GDP) of the Western European nations index the relative allocation of national resources to the military sector. The indices of the conflict behaviors nations direct towards one another (taken from Azar and Sloan: 1975) reflect peacetime political-military operations and armed conflict, along with nonmilitary factors.

4. The prominent role accorded to psychological factors such as perceptions in American literature can be seen in George and Smoke's recent (1974) review of the American theory of deterrence and in recent statements by Secretaries of Defense Schlesinger (1975) and Rumsfeld (1976). The importance that the Soviets attach to such considerations can be seen in Arbatov (1973: 7-16, 38, 170) and Tomashevsky (1974: 82-83).

5. In this paper 'perceptions' are assessed on the basis of verbal behavior. The analysis is predicated on the assumption that the public articulations of leaders are a fairly reliable guide to at least some of their nations' behaviors (for some reasons why this relationship should hold, see Brodin (1972)). This paper construes perceptions in a fairly narrow sense as articulated attitudes dealing with a single subject: interbloc tension in Europe. In taking this approach, I have been influenced by the arguments of Campbell (1963). Other authors (e.g., Cottam (1977) and Kirk (1976)) use the term in a different, more general, way to refer to the total world view or stimulus field of an actor.

6. The data set is presented in Goldmann and Hall (1973). An English language description of the file is contained in Goldmann (1973). Goldmann's principal analyses of the data, which focus on the system level rather than the national level emphasized in the present paper, are to be found in his (1974).

7. This is one of the standard content analysis formulas: (Janis and Fadner (1949)). Two versions of the formula are used: $C = f^2 - fu/rt$ (if $f > u$) and $C = fu - u^2/rt$ (if $f < u$) where f = the number of favorable units of content; u = the

number of unfavorable units; r = the number of thematically relevant units (favorable, unfavorable, and neutral); and t = the total number of units of content (the sum of r plus the irrelevant themes). Janis and Fadner provide the derivations for the formulas and justify their employment as content analysis measures.

8. The six missing values for the Federal Republic of Germany are due to the insufficient number of statements by German leaders in the years listed. The variable codes in the table are in the format that will be used throughout the paper: capital letters for countries and small letters for variable types.

9. Careful intercoder reliability checks were also made; for further discussion of reliability and validity see Goldmann (1974).

10. The frequencies are presented in Goldmann and Hall (1972: 95).

11. However, this 'psychological detente' does follow (or co-occur with) the earlier series of Soviet-American accords that began with the 'Hotline' and Limited Test Ban agreements in 1963.

12. More recent years are currently being analyzed at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs. An interim report (Goldmann and Lagerkranz, 1977) indicates that the average perception values for all NATO nations over the period 1971-75 continued to be located in the positive/favorable range of the index.

13. Few studies have attempted to empirically relate perceptions to other facets of the international system. For research in this area see Goldmann (1974), Peterson (1972), Holsti and Sullivan (1969) and Rattinger (1975). Because little research has been done in this field, precise apriori specifications cannot be given for regression equations. As a result, the analyses to be presented do not place any emphasis upon the interpretation of regression (path) coefficients, the magnitudes and signs of which might change as a function of minor alterations in specification (on this point see Gordon (1968)). This paper uses Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression to identify regular patterns of covariation that might reflect the functioning of a larger system of East-West competition, even though OLS cannot capture such an interdependent system in all of its complexity. To reflect this use of OLS, the term 'connections' is employed: connections are the patterns of covariation that are used to infer the existence of the systemic structure. Cortes *et al.*, (1974: 27) discuss the use of covariation as an index of the potential existence of a complex interdependent system. It should be noted that the approach to regression analysis employed in this paper has been specifically tailored to the characteristics of the research questions being investigated, e.g., the absence of a large body of previous research in the area. Under other circumstances more traditional approaches to structural equations have more merit, e.g., where two or more models can be formulated and competitively evaluated on the basis of more extensive theoretical 'priors' than are available here. For further discussion of the methodological assumptions and approaches that shape the analyses in this paper, consult "European Perceptions and East-West Competition" (paper presented at the March 1977 meeting of the International Studies Association).

14. Further discussion of this variable is contained in my paper: "American Political-Military Operations and the Structure of the International System, 1946-1975." The Goldmann analysis cited is found in his book (1974).

15. Azar and Sloan (1975). This data file begins in 1948. In using these scores, I make one departure from the practice of Azar and Sloan. I conceive of the two scales as conflict and cooperation 'meters.' As a result, when there is no meter reading (no or very few codable events in a given year), I consider it to be a very

low value of conflict or cooperation, one below the sensitivity threshold of the meter. Hence I assign codes of '8' where Azar and Sloan assign no value due to insufficient data.

16. This is a very abbreviated presentation; Azar and Sloan (1975) provide a detailed description of the data set. Indices of this type have been used with increasing frequency in recent defense analyses. A recent special issue of the journal *International Studies Quarterly* (March 1977, "International Crisis: Progress and Prospects for Applied Forecasting and Management") edited by Dr. Robert A. Young of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency provides a number of examples of studies which use indicators of this variety to deal with the problem of crisis anticipation and warning.

17. In dealing with this set of variables, it is important to bear in mind the structural context within which these states act. Since they are not the central 'polar' actors in the Western alliance system, there is a sense in which their behaviors might be less related to the general course of East-West relations than would be the case for the two superpowers. The latter two states have no superordinate actor to call upon for assistance if their behaviors should provoke an unanticipated reaction from the other opposing superpower. Given the nature of interstate relations (with a preponderance of words over deeds) this difference should be reflected not in the means for the conflict variables (US-SUC, SU-USC, and the three Western European conflict variables all fall into the 9.8-10.0 verbal end of the scale), but rather in their scores' variances, with superpowers having more consequential and less variable behaviors. When we examine the standard deviations for the five variables this is exactly what we find: US-SUC = .17; SU-USC = .24; UK-SUC = .34; FR-SUC = .40; WG-SUC = .30, with the European states' values being roughly twice as large as that of the United States and larger than that of the USSR.

18. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (1975: 122-123).

19. Indicators of European states' amicable or cooperative behaviors towards the Soviet Union are also found in the Azar-Sloan file but were not used in the analyses to be presented.

20. All correlations and regressions in this paper are estimated using the pair-wise deletion option of SPSS (Nie *et al.*, 1970).

21. Given the scoring of the balance and conflict behavior variables, we expect them to have a negative or inverse correlation with the perceptions, as is the case in table 4. The highest numerical values in the conflict and balance scales (scores of '15' and '4,' respectively) should be associated with the lowest numerical values of the perception variables (negative scores through -1.00), relating the most unfavorable perceptions (most tension perceived) with high levels of conflict and 'objective' tension in the strategic balance.

22. In this paper all regressions are estimated for the span of the dependent variable, using the pair-wise deletion option of SPSS. Since the event data (Azar-Sloan) variables begin in 1948, nonevent data predictors were used, in a separate series of equations, to produce estimates for 1946 and 1947.

These equations are the result of relatively weak specifications. As a result, little attention will be paid to the partial regression coefficients which are often the central focus in such analyses because these coefficients are often sensitive to minor changes in specification. This may at first glance appear to be a somewhat anomalous research decision, given the presentation of the estimated values in the

figures, which are computed on the basis of the regression coefficients. This anomaly is avoided by limiting the interpretation that is made of these statistics in a way that can be brought out by a simple thought experiment. Assume that the regression weights in an equation were to be artificially changed so that the signs and relative magnitudes of weights varied but the net results, in terms of R^2 and the fit between estimated and actual values, did not change to any great degree. For present purposes these alterations in the equation would not have any analytical consequences. Obviously this would not be the case if emphasis was being placed on the signs, statistical significance, and magnitudes of the partial coefficients.

Since the substantive interpretation of autocorrelation (and the common 'corrections' for autocorrelation) is not immediately clear, no response has been made to the results of the Durbin-Watson tests which, along with the regression coefficients, are appended to my 1977 International Studies Association paper.

23. Because the predictors are intercorrelated (multicollinearity), the dependent variables are in a sense 'over determined.' These comparisons of hierarchical and nonhierarchical factors involve two comparisons: (i) how much variance (R^2) does each set account for on its own? (ii) how much does it add when introduced into an equation already containing the other set? Using the variables underlined in the correlation analysis as the candidate predictors in each set, the results for France and West Germany are:

| | | | | |
|------------------|---|-------|--------------------------------------|-------|
| France (plus) | hierarchical R^2 | = .80 | nonhierarchical R^2 | = .12 |
| | <u>nonhierarchical R^2</u> | = .80 | <u>hierarchical R^2</u> | = .80 |
| | increment | .00 | | .68 |
| Germany | hierarchical R^2 | = .75 | nonhierarchical R^2 | = .18 |
| | <u>nonhierarchical R^2</u> | = .81 | <u>hierarchical R^2</u> | = .81 |
| | | .06 | | .63 |

All of the predictors in the UK equation are hierarchical factors. (In each of these comparisons the second line presents the R^2 value for the sum of the two sets; the third line gives the increment in R^2 that results from adding the second set).

24. None of the signs of the underlined correlations is in a direction that contradicts our *a priori* expectations.

25. These relationships are estimated over the period 1948-70. When the results presented in these figures are examined, it is important to bear in mind the points made in note 17 regarding the structural context within which these nations acted.

26. Holsti and Sullivan (1969).

27. All predictors in the West German equation are hierarchical factors.

| | | | | |
|----|---|-------|--------------------------------------|-------|
| UK | hierarchical R^2 | = .32 | nonhierarchical R^2 | = .32 |
| | <u>nonhierarchical R^2</u> | = .48 | <u>hierarchical R^2</u> | = .48 |
| | | .16 | | .16 |
| FR | hierarchical R^2 | = .31 | nonhierarchical R^2 | = .48 |
| | <u>nonhierarchical R^2</u> | = .65 | <u>hierarchical R^2</u> | = .65 |
| | | .34 | | .17 |

28. The intercorrelations of the three factors which have been singled out as dependent or criterion variables in the analyses are:

| | | | | | |
|---------------|-----------------------|---------------------|---------------|-----------------------|---------------------|
| <u>UKp</u> | <u>UK-SUc</u> -.35 | <u>UKdb</u> -.20 | <u>FRp</u> | <u>FR-SUc</u> -.33 | <u>FRdb</u> -.43 |
| <u>UK-SUc</u> | | .06 | <u>FR-SUc</u> | | .44 |
| <u>WGp</u> | <u>WG-SUc</u> -.27 | <u>WGdb</u> -.31 | | | |
| <u>WG-SUc</u> | | .21 | | | |

The two points of significance in these tables are that all of the correlations are in the expected directions and that the French values are more 'connected' than those of the other two states.

29. These equations are estimated over the period 1953-70.

30. In the case of the United Kingdom, all of the predictors which met the .30 criterion were hierarchical factors.

| | | | | |
|----|--------------------------------|-------|--------------------------------|-------|
| FR | hierarchical R ² | = .79 | nonhierarchical R ² | = .18 |
| | nonhierarchical R ² | = .79 | hierarchical R ² | = .79 |
| | | .00 | | .61 |
| WG | hierarchical R ² | = .28 | nonhierarchical R ² | = .25 |
| | nonhierarchical R ² | = .41 | hierarchical R ² | = .41 |
| | | .13 | | .16 |

As with the earlier uses of this kind of test, the first line presents the amount of variance that can be accounted for by one of the two sets; the second line shows how much variance can be explained when the second set is added to the first; and the third line presents the increment in variance explained that results when the second set is added to the first. The most important points in this comparison are the amount of variance explained by each individual set (hierarchical or nonhierarchical) and the increments.

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and shows the course they have taken since World War II. On the basis of an assessment of these trends, some implications are drawn which bear on American (and Western) political-military policy. The third section deals with selected aspects of the larger framework of East-West competition within which leaders' perceptions were formed over the period. The analysis centers on such factors as Soviet and American actions, the strategic balance between the superpowers, and the defense burdens (defense expenditures/GDP) of the three Western European nations. This analysis shows the extent to which the leaders' perceptions can be empirically related to other elements in this larger framework of competition. The section also highlights some of the more significant relationships between nonperceptual elements in this ensemble, such as the relationship between Soviet and American behaviors and the defense expenditures of the Western European states. The final section provides summary conclusions concerning the extent to which factors such as elite perceptions can be systematically monitored, their position within the larger structure of East-West relations, and the implications which the paper's findings have for defense analysis.

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| Defense Logistics Studies Information Exchange | 1 |
| Institute for Military Assistance | 1 |
| US Army Federal Executive Fellow, Brookings Institution | 1 |
| US Navy | 2 |
| US Marine Corps | 2 |
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| 432d Military Intelligence Detachment | 1 |
| 434th Military Intelligence Detachment | 1 |
| 467th Military Intelligence Detachment | 1 |
| I ROTC Region Headquarters | 1 |
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